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. two-dimensional perceptual space leads Carpenter (1989) to conclude that unimodal taste distributions encourage brands to locate at the center of the market when advertising and distribution effects are not prominent. It is important therefore to understand how consumer heterogeneity influences product positioning decisions of firms. Would the strategic impact of price competition continue to dominate even if the market is relatively homogeneous? Would non-uniformity of consumer preferences bestow special advantages to first movers by allowing them to capture majority segments? Would incentives to deter entry vary with different patterns of consumer preference heterogeneity? We seek to answer these questions.
We study the nature of competition among firms by investigating the properties of sub-game perfect Nash equilibria in markets with two, three or four brands and nonuniform consumer preference distributions. Many of the resulting position-price equilibria are different from those obtained for uniform preference distributions. D'Aspermont et al. ( 1979) and Hauser ( 1988) , for example, find that for uniform preference distributions the equilibrium is one of maximal differentiation. With non-uniform preferences, on the other hand, we find that brands are neither clustered nor maximally differentiated. With three brands, for example, we find that the exterior brands do not move away as far as possible from the central brand. They take internal positions, and these positions are related directly to the variance of the distribution of consumer preferences.
We also present results for two and four-firm equilibria. With unimodal symmetric preference distributions there are two equilibria in a duopoly, each a mirror image of the other. When consumers are relatively heterogeneous in their preference for the product attributes, the resulting equilibrium is one of maximal differentiation. However, when consumer preferences are relatively homogeneous, the equilibrium is asymmetric around the modal consumer preference. That is, one brand positions internally while the other chooses a position at the opposite extreme of the product space. Further, the switch from the symmetric to the asymmetric equilibrium happens abruptly as the consumers distribution becomes more concentrated. For four brands, we find equilibria for uniform as well as unimodal distributions. In general, nonuniform distributions lead to results that are markedly different from those obtained for uniform consumer distributions.
The optimal positions of brands depend critically on the total number of brands and the sequence in which they enter the market. To date, most models of competitive brand positioning assume that the number of brands in the market is determined exogenously and that these brands enter (or reposition) simultaneously (Hauser 1988 , Neven 1986 ). In addition to examining simultaneous positioning, we also investigate equilibrium when firms enter sequentially. We assume that early entrants have foresight and are able to predict how later entrants will respond to their positions (Prescott and Visscher 1977) . As Lane (1980, 238) , argued, sequential entry with foresight is a useful equilibrium concept "because it enables entry to be made endogenous to the model in a meaningful manner." We explore how early entrants can use their positions to deter entry of other brands and how entry deterrence strategies are affected by the distribution of consumer preferences. We find that the equilibrium configuration under sequential entry differs from that under simultaneous positioning.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 defines the main features of our model. Section 2.1 briefly states our assumptions regarding the product space. In ?2.2 we outline our use of the beta distribution to describe the distribution of consumer preferences. Section 2.3 describes the nature of the positioning-price game. Section 3 presents results for the simultaneous entry case. We discuss, in turn, the price-location equilibria for two, three, and four brands. Section 4 looks at positioning strategies when firms enter the market sequentially rather than simultaneously. Section 5 presents some concluding remarks.
The Model

The Nature of the Product Space
The first step in positioning a brand is to distinguish the salient qualities or attributes on which brands differ. These attributes comprise the product space in which brands compete. A brand's relative position in this space partially determines its ability to attract customers in the competitive marketplace. We follow Hauser and Shugan's (1983) Defender framework in our assumptions regarding the product space. Each brand in our model is characterized by its position in a two-dimensional space. The particular position a brand occupies in this space is determined by: a) the level of two physical attributes (x,, x2) possessed by each unit of the brand, and b) the price of the brand. For example, assume that a unit of brand j has xlj and x2j units respectively of the two attributes, and its price is pj. Brand j's position in the per dollar product space is then given by the coordinates (xjl/pj, x2j/pj). The utility consumer i receives from this brand is Ui = Wi (Xlj/pj) + i 2(x2j/pj)
where wil and wi2 are the relative weights the consumer places on attributes 1 and 2 respectively. Let yi = arctan (wi2/ wi ) be the address for consumer i. This is the angle that the consumer's indifference curve makes with the vertical axis. This angle represents the consumer's relative preference for the two attributes and varies between 0 and 90 degrees. A consumer who considers the first attribute as much more important than the second has a low y value, while one who places more weight on the second and less weight on the first has a y near 90 degrees. Brands too can be identified by unique addresses. When all brands have the same price, they can each be addressed by 0, the angle made by a ray connecting the brand's coordinate position to the origin.' Assume that consumer tastes are distributed according to a density function f(y), such that maximize their own profits. Initially we assume that a given number of efficient brands already exist in the market and no entry or exit is allowed. Further, we assume that brands cannot change their rank ordering along the horizontal axis of the product space. This assumption eliminates the possibility of brands changing their positions radically. We also assume that all consumers have a finite and common reservation price for the product category.2 Regarding costs, we assume that each brand has the same marginal cost of production, c, which is constant and independent of the position for the brand or the level of output. When studying sequential entry situations, we also assume that firms incur a fixed cost F of entering the market. Given this framework, we can write brand j's profit function as:
jh Since the demand function is continuous in prices, so is the profit function.
Distribution of Consumer Preferences
So far, our model is similar to many spatial economics models (e.g., D'Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse 1979, Economides 1989, Hotelling 1929, and Hauser 1988). As noted, our main point of departure from these models is the manner in which consumer preferences are distributed. Unlike earlier models, which assume uniform consumer preferences, we allow more general consumer preference distributions. Specifically, we assume that the distribution of consumer preferences, f( y), follows a generalized beta distribution over the spectrum of consumer preferences; that is [0, 90] where i is the gamma function and ia and a2 are the parameters of the beta distribution. where F` is the gamma function and cu] and c~2 are the parameters of the beta distribution.
The relative values of ao and a2 determine the shape of the beta distribution. When they are both equal to 1, f(y) is distributed uniformly. The distribution is symmetric when a, = a2 = a. The variance of the symmetric beta is inversely related to a. For a > 1, the higher the value of a, the more peaked and concentrated is the distribution. Conversely, for a < 1, the lower the value of a, the more U-shaped and more polarized is the distribution.3
Although other types of nonuniform distributions (e.g., the normal distribution) could be posited, we chose the beta distribution because it is very flexible and can be constrained to the interval [0, 90] without need for truncation. Moreover, the beta distribution has been widely used in the marketing literature to characterize consumer heterogeneity. A number of studies have found that the beta and the Dirichlet distributions fit empirical distributions of consumer purchases very well (e.g., Ehrenberg 1959 Ehrenberg , 1972 . In a recent study, Waarts, Carree, and Wierenga (1991) extended Shugan's (1987) procedure for mapping brand positions in a Defender framework from scanner data. In deriving their maps these authors, too, assumed that consumer preferences followed a beta distribution. In addition, as Shugan (1987) notes, the advantage of the beta in this context is that it allows a nested test for the uniform distribution. With the beta distribution one can vary the degree of heterogeneity in consumer preferences while holding constant the number of consumers in the market. This allows us to test the sensitivity of results to the level of heterogeneity in consumer preferences. For symmetric unimodal distributions, the level of heterogeneity in consumer preferences can be measured by the parameter a. The higher the value of a, the more peaked the distribution and higher the level of homogeneity in preferences.
The Nature of the Game
We assume that firms compete in a game of two stages. In the first stage, firms choose positions, and in the second stage they choose prices. In the second stage, when choosing prices, firms consider the positions of all firms as fixed. This stage is sometimes referred to as the price subgame. In the first stage, when choosing its position, each firm correctly anticipates the effect of its position choice on the equilibrium prices determined in the second stage. This correct anticipation of the influence of position on price is formalized in the subgame perfect equilibrium concept, as seen below.
Before going into the formal definitions, let us note that the intuition behind this twostage structure lies in the fact that prices are more flexible than positions in the short run. Thus, the second stage of the game can be interpreted as the short run where only prices are flexible, while the first stage can be viewed as the long-term when strategic decisions to determine the brand's position in the product space are taken. Once made, a brand's position is assumed to be permanent because of the high cost of repositioning.
Some may argue that while a firm in this model has foresight to anticipate price competition in the positioning stage, it takes the competitors' prices as given when setting its own price. Although this may seem limiting at first glance, we feel that the model is a good representation of the world in which firms adjust and re-adjust their prices in competitive markets until they arrive at an "equilibrium" through a process not unlike that underlying Nash equilibrium.
Formally, the profits of firm j, j = 1, . . , n, depend on the vector of prices charged by all firms, pi = (Pi, P2, ... 
Competitive Equilibrium with Simultaneous Entry
In this section we look at equilibrium positions when the number of brands is fixed exogenously and when firms choose positions simultaneously. We assume, without loss of generality, that the fixed cost F is zero. We first discuss duopoly markets.
Equilibrium for Two Brands
It is now generally accepted that in the "Defender" model when consumers are uniformly distributed and brands compete in position as well as price, the resulting equilibrium configuration is one of maximal differentiation. That is, the brands position themselves as far as possible from each other (Hauser 1988 ). Our results show that the equilibrium configuration depends on the nature of consumer preference. Maximal differentiation is optimal only when consumer preferences are heterogeneous. For unimodal and sufficiently concentrated distributions of preferences, we find that one of the brands chooses an interior position in equilibrium. In marketing terms, this implies that one brand focuses on the majority segment, while the other follows a niche strategy. We first focus on the price subgame and then discuss the positioning configuration.
3.1.1. Price Competition: Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium. In the last stage of the game, firms choose prices. Firm j maximizes Hj( p, 0 ) with respect to pj, keeping all other arguments fixed. Since each profit function is a continuous and bounded function defined on a compact convex set (subset of Rn), we can utilize the non-cooperative equilibrium existence theorems of Nash (1951) and Debreu (1952) . These theorems show that a sufficient condition for the existence of a pure strategy price equilibrium as a solution to the first order conditions (7) is that each profit function nH is quasi-concave in pj and locally concave in the neighborhood of the equilibrium price. Further, Caplin and Nalebuff ( 1991, 38), show that a sufficient condition for quasi-concavity of 11j in pj is that the reciprocal of the demand, 1 /Dj(pj) is convex in own price pj.
Furthermore, a unique price equilibrium is required for each vector of product positions in order to define a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the overall position-price game. To verify uniqueness, we utilize Rosen's (1965) extension of the Gale-Nikaido (1965) univalence theorem. This theorem states that, if profit functions fulfill the equilibrium existence requirements stated in the previous paragraph, and further the profit functions have a negative quasi-definite Jacobian in their concave portion, then the price subgame has a unique equilibrium. In our setup, the Jacobian is
Matrix J is negative quasi-definite if J* = J + jT is negative definite,7 where the superscript T denotes a transposed matrix.8
In our model, for unimodal beta densities, the profit function of each firm is quasiconcave in its own price as pictured in Figure 2 . We establish the quasi-concavity of lHl in pj by verifying the convexity of 1 /Dj in pj on a dense grid ofp, and pj for given positions of 6i and Oj also on a dense grid. Given the continuity and smoothness of the second derivatives of the demand function, the convexity of 1I/Dj on a dense grid is sufficient to establish the convexity of 1 /Dj for all pi and pj in the compact domain. The exact form of the demand functions and the algorithm used are described in the Appendix.9
After determining existence of price equilibrium, we also determine that this equilibrium is unique. We establish uniqueness by verifying the negative quasi-definiteness of the Jacobian on a dense grid of pi and pj for given positions for 0i and 0j on a dense grid. Given the continuity and smoothness of the second derivatives of the demand function, the negative quasi-definiteness of the Jacobian on the dense grid is sufficient to establish 7 A matrix is negative definite if the determinants of its principal minors are alternating in sign, starting with a negative sign for the first principal minor. 8 For symmetric games, i.e., if 2ll1/Ip2 = d2f2/8p2 and (2H11/paIp2 : 2I2/3pPp2, J negative quasidefinite is equivalent to J negative definite, as simple calculation shows. However, for asymmetric games, such as ours, for general positions, negative quasi-definiteness is less restrictive than negative definiteness. For details see Friedman (1986) .
9 Unfortunately, we cannot directly apply the theorems in Caplin and Nalebuff( 1991) which depend upon the Prekopa-Borell theorem on p-concavity of aggregate demand functions. There is no general theorem on pconcavity of our demand function given the per dollar utility function and the beta distribution on the arctangent of consumer weights we employ. In fact, using the Caplin-Nalebuff approach we can prove analytically that 1 / D)j is convex for a beta distribution of the consumer's ratio of weights. But the tangent transformation, which is essential for the Defender model, does not preserve or enhance concavity; thus, it does not allow a straightforward extension of this result. Nevertheless, the success of our algorithm provides very strong evidence that an analytical proof can be written for the proposition that the beta distribution on the consumer's angle results in 1/Dj convex. 
dO1 01 Opp I, dO l2 dO. d0, P2 dO l because dHll/dp = 0 from profit maximization of firm 1 in the last stage. At constant prices, as firm 1 positions itself further inwards and closer to its opponent, its demand increases, and so does its profit; therefore, dl /00 > 0. Now, because the products are substitutes, d II / p 2 > 0. When the products become closer substitutes (as 0 increases) the subgame equilibrium prices decrease and dp /ldO < 0. Therefore, the second term in the RHS of( 13) is negative, and a priori the sign of dl{6(O)/dO1 is indeterminate since it is the sum of two terms of opposite signs. price competition that results from such moves. When c is high, as 01 comes further inside, the increase in demand overshadows the decrease in price, and profits start increasing in 01, eventually reaching a peak. As a increases, the game becomes more competitive, but prices decrease only slightly for all 01. Thus the shape of the profit function is driven more by changes in market share rather than changes in the equilibrium price. Consider, for example, the case when a = 11.2. nI4(O1; 90) initially falls as the brand moves its position inward from zero (see Figure 3c ). Profits reach a minimum at 01 = 8, and then increase, reaching a maximum at 01 = 27. To understand the factors that shape the profit function, consider the situation when 01 = 8, 02 = 90. The lower brand's market share in this situation is 0.539523 and its equilibrium price is 1.66207. Its profit, therefore, is 0.357202. Now let brand l's position change from 8 degrees to 9 degrees. The move toward the other brand intensifies price competition and reduces the equilibrium price to 1.6559. But, brand l's market share increases to 0.544678. Thus, profit, at this new position, is 0.357254, which is higher than before. Within the interval (8 < 01 < 27) the lower brand has an incentive to move inward since the gain in market share compensates for the reduction in margin. For 0 < 01 < 8 and 01 > 27, on the other hand, the gain in market share is not enough to compensate for the lower margin resulting from reduced prices.
In Figure 3 as consumer preferences become less heterogeneous (as a increases) the right peak of the profit function rises while the left peak falls. This is because, as a increases, there is a bigger demand reward for firm 1 when it is near the peak of the density function. Eventually, for a > 11.1, the right peak of the profit function is higher, precipitating the choice of an interior position of firm 1. position. The points of intersection (indicated by bullets in the diagram) of the two reaction functions give the two equilibrium configurations. In the first equilibrium, 61 is positioned at 0 degrees and 02 at 57.5 degrees. The second equilibrium is the mirror image of the first and has 01 at 32.5 degrees and 62 at 90 degrees. Notice that, despite the discontinuities of the best reply functions (precipitated by the lack of quasi-concavity of profits with respect to the position), for some Os equilibrium exists. This is indeed a case where the typical sufficient condition for existence (quasi-concavity) fails but an equilibrium still exists.'0 Figure 5 shows the subgame-perfect equilibrium positions for two brands for markets with symmetric and unimodal consumer preferences. For markets that have a low degree of homogeneity (characterized by beta distributions with 1 < a < 11.1 ) the equilibrium positions are at 6* = 0, 60 = 90. Since the preference distribution is relatively heterogeneous there are no positions that give preferential access to large groups of consumers and there is little incentive for brands to cluster. Firms, therefore, move as far away as possible to reduce the impact of price competition.
For markets with symmetric and unimodal consumer preferences that have a high degree of homogeneity (beta distributions with a >? 11.1), there are two equilibria. As is clear from the previous discussion pertaining to best response functions, these equilibrium configurations yield asymmetric product positions and each configuration is a mirror image of the other. In each configuration, one brand positions internally while the other chooses a position at the opposite extreme of the product space. That is, in the first equilibrium the lower brand is positioned at 0 = 0, and the upper brand is positioned 10 A similar example of existence of equilibrium despite the lack of quasi-concavity can be found in Economides Table 1 presents information on the equilibrium positions, profits, prices and market shares for selected values of a. For all preference distributions with a < 11.1, the equilibrium pattern is one of maximal differentiation and the two brands have the same price, equal market shares, and equal profits. Although the equilibrium locations remain the same, equilibrium price and profits increase with higher levels of heterogeneity in consumer preferences (lower values of a). Heterogeneity reduces the level of price rivalry and give firms greater freedom to raise prices. When consumer preferences are uniform (extreme heterogeneity), price rivalry is less intense and the assumption of finite consumer For each a > 11.1 there is an alternate equilibrium that is a mirror image of the one shown here. r is the reservation price and c the marginal cost. reservation price is required for the equilibrium to exist. As heterogeneity decreases, the price competition intensifies and firms therefore lower prices in order to maintain their market shares.
The pattern of market shares, profits, and prices become markedly different when a exceeds 11.1. As noted, the equilibrium positions are no longer maximally differentiated, and there are two (rather than one) equilibrium patterns. As shown in Table 1 , the internal brand in the asymmetric equilibria garners a significantly higher market share and earns a higher profit than the exterior brand. Because of its proximity to the modal consumer preference, the internal brand charges a higher price than the exterior brand. But, since the two equilibrium patterns are mirror images of each other, the final equilibrium cannot be predicted a priori.
It is evident from Table 1 that the position of the interior brand is a function of the level of heterogeneity in consumer preferences. As the preference distribution becomes more peaked (a increases), the brand's equilibrium position moves toward the center of the market, al = 45. Thus, the more homogeneous consumer preferences are, the greater the incentive for the firm to position the brand close to the mode of the preference distribution. The move toward the center of the positioning spectrum by one brand, however, does not draw the second brand inward despite the lower market share. While the second brand can increase market share by moving toward the center of the market, such a move would induce greater price competition and reduce profits because of lower margins. Thus, while one brand positions itself to appeal to the majority of the market that prefers both attributes equally, the other brand positions itself to serve the niche that has a strong preference for one attribute over the other. The niche strategy is more profitable than a "me-too" strategy even though this results in a lower market share. Hauser (1988) . But maximal differentiation is no longer the equilibrium solution when we depart from the uniform distribution assumption. As consumer preferences get more homogeneous, the location of more consumers near the middle of the attribute space draws the exterior brands toward the central brand. This occurs despite the fact that reduced differentiation from the central brand leads to more intense price competition. As the exterior firms move inward, they are forced to reduce their prices. The central brand then reduces its price in response. As a consequence, equilibrium profits for all three brands fall as the consumer distribution gets more peaked. This is seen clearly in Table 2 .
Equilibrium in
The inward move by the exterior brands as consumer preferences become more homogeneous poses severe penalties for them. As seen in Table 2 differentiation decreases. The two exterior brands can earn higher profits by forsaking their internal equilibrium positions and moving to 01 = 0 and 03 = 90, respectively. The maximal differentiation configuration is more profitable for all three brands compared to the subgame-perfect equilibrium. However, maximal differentiation is not an equilibrium, since the two exterior brands have incentives to deviate unilaterally from this configuration. These two brands are caught in a classical prisoner's dilemma. They can both earn more if they differentiate, but it is not profitable for either brand to differentiate unless it is guaranteed that the other will, too. If one brand moves to the edge of the product spectrum unilaterally, the other will remain near the center. The maximal differentiation pattern thus is not self-enforcing.
Bi-Modal Consumer
Preferences. Thus far, our focus has been on markets where consumer preferences are distributed in a unimodal fashion, with modal consumers giving equal weights to both product attributes. In this section we examine competitive equilibria when preference distributions are bimodal: One group of consumers prefers the first attribute much more than the second, while the other group prefers the second attribute. Only a few customers prefer products that combine equal levels of both attributes. Such U-shaped preference distributions can be represented by a beta with a < 1.0. With bimodal consumer preferences and three brands, a subgame perfect equilibrium exists only for moderately polarized preference distributions (beta distributions with .69 < a < 1.0). There is no stable equilibrium when the level of polarization is high (beta distributions with a < 0.69).
When consumer preferences are moderately bipolar (distributed beta with 0.69 < a < 1.0) the equilibrium location pattern is one of maximal differentiation with the three brands positioned at 01 = 0, 02 = 45, 03 = 90 respectively. The exterior brands focus on the two modal consumer groups with extreme preferences, while the central brand focuses on consumers who prefer products that combine both attributes. Note from Table 3 , however, that despite the exterior brands' focus on modal consumer groups, the central brand still gets a much greater market share because, as a whole, it is preferred by more consumers. As one would expect, the market share of the central brand decreases and the shares of the exterior brands increase as the preference distribution departs from uniformity and becomes more U-shaped. The exterior brands gain share and profits as consumer preferences become polarized. For example, the profit of each exterior brand increases from 0.1205 to 0.1589, an increase of over 28% as a goes from 1.0 to 0.7. Interestingly, the profit for the central brand, too, increases, albeit at a slower rate, as the preference distribution becomes more polarized. For example, when a = 0.7, the profit for the central brand is 0.2536 compared to 0.2411 when the distribution is uniform. As consumer preferences become more bipolar, the exterior brands tend to increase price to take advantage of their proximity to consumer preferences. As the prices of the exterior brands increase, the central brand is also able to increase its price and consequently earn higher profit. Thus, one effect of increased polarization of consumer preferences is reduced price rivalry and greater profits for all firms in the industry. When the preference distribution becomes highly polarized, the market share of the central brand decreases substantially, and its competitive position weakens. This creates an incentive for the second brand to undercut one of the exterior brands in price in order to gain market share. In three-brand markets with consumer preferences distributed beta with a < 0.69, there is some position 02 E (0, 90) at which the profit maximizing price Figure 7b shows the corresponding level of profit for brand 2. As one would expect, brand 2's market share increases as its price falls. When P2 falls to 1.016 the second brand dominates brand 1 and garners a market share of approximately 95%. Although brand 3 is not dominated, its market share is only 0.05 (brand 1 has no sales since it is dominated). Undercutting is a viable strategy for brand 2 since the undercutting price exceeds the marginal cost. Recall that all brands have a marginal cost of one. Moreover, as shown in Figure 7b , the profit from undercutting exceeds profit at any other price. For all cases with a < 0.69 that we have analyzed, there is a position 02, at which the central brand can profitably undercut the market. This leads us to believe that in three brand markets equilibrium is unlikely when consumer preferences are highly polarized.
Equilibrium in Four-brand Markets
In addition to the two and three-brand scenarios, we also investigated the four-brand case. We were able to obtain four brand equilibrium for the uniform and symmetric unimodal preference distributions. For uniform preferences, Hauser (1988) had noted that maximal differentiation (i.e., 60 = 0, 02 = 30, 03 = 60, and 04 = 90) is not an equilibrium configuration in the four-brand case. Maximal differentiation does maximize product class profits, and all brands are profitable. But each brand also has a unilateral incentive to move toward the center. Thus, maximal differentiation does not result in a stable configuration. Despite extensive search, Hauser was unable to obtain an equilibrium for four brands. He concluded that a subgame perfect equilibrium in a noncooperative game is unlikely to exist with four brands. He argued that implicit cooperation through repeated playing of the game may lead firms to move and stay at the maximum differentiation positions.
In 
Competitive Equilibrium with Sequential Entry
The results presented in Section 3 are based on the assumption that all brands enter the market (or reposition) at the same time, and there is no temporal sequence in the positioning decisions of firms. How would the nature of the equilibrium change if firms entered the market sequentially rather than simultaneously? If firms enter in a pre-determined sequence, one would generally expect early entrants to garner higher market shares and earn higher profits because they can capture prime positions. This is especially true when consumer preferences are nonuniform since firms have a strong incentive to position close to the modal consumer preference.
Here we consider that firms choose product positions sequentially in a predetermined sequence. In such a situation there exists a strategic asymmetry in that the later entrant can observe the positions of earlier entrants while incumbent firms must anticipate how their positions will affect the decisions of those entering after them. An incumbent firm has to put itself in the shoes of the later entrant and asks how it would behave in the same circumstance. Based on its expectations regarding competition, the ith firm enters the market with a single brand if its anticipated profit is greater than the fixed cost of entry. Early entrants can deter the entry of later brands if it is profitable to do so. We also assume that firms set prices only after all firms have entered the market, and, therefore, they do not consider any transitory profits.
The In this section, we discuss the market structure with sequential entry for two unimodal, symmetric preference distributions. Specifically, we analyze the cases when a = 3 and a = 16. In the simultaneous positioning game, we found that the nature of the equilibrium in a duopoly depended upon the range of a. Therefore, we choose two different levels of heterogeneity, one with a < 11.1 and the other with a > 11.1.
Fixed Number of Brands
We first look at the case when the number of brands in the market is fixed exogenously. In this situation, individual firms cannot influence the number of brands in the market. We find that, when the number of brands is predetermined and firms maximize longterm profits, the market structures under sequential entry are identical to those under simultaneous positioning. In a duopoly, for example, the equilibrium positions, prices and profits are the same as those shown in Table 1 . When the level of consumer heterogeneity is relatively high (e.g., a = 3), there is no advantage of early entry and both firms earn equal profits. However, when the preference distribution gets more peaked (e.g., a = 16) the first entrant gets a significant advantage by positioning toward the modal preference.
When there are three firms, the equilibrium positions are the same as those shown in Table 2 . For both preference distributions, the first firm always locates at the center of the market to take advantage of the concentration of consumers there. Because of its position, the first brand earns higher profits than the two later entrants, both of whom earn equal profits. There are two possible optimal positions for the second firm, one on each side of the first brand. Because of the symmetry in the market it is not possible to predict a priori which of these two positions the second firm will choose. Once the second firm commits to one of its two optimal positions, the third firm takes the other position. Note that the second and third firms have the same market share and earn equal profits. There is, therefore, no special advantage of being the second firm in this market. Only the first firm gets additional profit due to its early entry.
Entry Deterrence
In the previous subsection we saw that, for a = 3 and when there is no further threat of entry to the duopoly, the equilibrium positions correspond to maximal differentiation. Both firms take up positions at the extreme of the product space, one on each side. At these positions each brand has a profit of 2.582 -F, where F is the fixed cost of entry. We now assume that the number of firms is not predetermined and a new firm will enter if it can find a position that results in a positive profit, after accounting for the fixed cost of entry. Would the maximal differentiation positions still be optimal for the first two firms if such a threat of entry was present?
Consider the case when F = 0.1. With two brands positioned at 0 and 90 degrees respectively, a third firm can enter profitably for this level of fixed cost. The new brand chooses its position at the center and reduces the profits of the earlier brands. In fact, the first two firms are unable to cover their fixed costs anymore. Given the negative consequence of new entry, the first two firms will choose positions so as to deter the entry of the third firm. We now look at such entry deterring behavior.
When firms can deter entry through their strategic actions, they have to be sophisticated in choosing their positions. The greater the number of potential entrants, the more complex is the decision for firms entering early in the sequence. For simplicity, consider a market in which the fixed cost of entry is such that no more than three firms can coexist with non-negative profits. In such a market, after the entry of the pioneer, a second firm enters only if it can cover its fixed cost of entry. If it decides to enter, the second firm then chooses either to deter or accommodate the entry of a third firm after weighing the relative profitability of the two actions. In an analogous manner, the first firm can, for high enough fixed costs, deter the entry of all later firms. In this case, the optimal entry deterring position for the first firm coincides with its monopoly position. Thus, for high fixed costs, further entry is naturally blocked, and the first firm earns monopoly profits. For lower levels of fixed costs, however, the first firm may not have available any position that deters the entry of the second firm. In such a situation, the first firm needs to choose its best position after anticipating the best-response positions of the later firms.
The market structure under free entry, therefore, depends critically on the level of fixed costs. Table 4 For a = 16, and for a fixed number of firms, the equilibrium positions in a duopoly are asymmetric. One firm locates at one extreme corner of the product space and the other takes an internal position on the opposite side. This asymmetric pattern is no longer optimal when there is a threat of entry by a third firm. When the threat of entry is high, i.e., for F E (.002, 0.005), the two incumbents take on internal symmetric positions around the mode of the preference distribution (01 = 50, 02 = 40). Because of their symmetric positions, both firms have the same market share, charge the same price, and, therefore, earn the same profit. Thus, the first firm gains no advantage from its early entry. Recall that if the market is a priori fixed to be a duopoly, the first firm to enter gets higher profits than the later entrant. But the threat of entry takes away this advantage.
As the fixed costs increase, the threat of entry reduces, and the behavior of the incumbents changes in a number of ways. Most importantly, the first entrant earns more profit than the second firm for all F > 0.005. Second, the equilibrium positions are no longer symmetrical. As the fixed cost increases, the first firm moves to the center of the market at the modal preference. The second firm, on the other hand, moves away from the first firm to reduce price competition. Third, contrary to the a = 3 case, the first firm does not move away from the center once the second firm reaches a market corner. In this case, the greater concentration of customers at the modal position makes this region attractive for the first firm. The first firm retains proximity to these consumers even when it has the opportunity to reduce price competition by moving away. It is for the same reason that one firm takes an internal position in a duopoly without free entry. Finally, when F > .025, the first firm can deter the entry of all future entrants. It selects its position at the center of the market and enjoys monopoly power.
Concluding Remarks
A well-formulated positioning strategy requires a simultaneous analysis of competitor and consumer behavior. In positioning models, the assumptions regarding competitive behavior have become increasingly sophisticated. Yet, the consumer environment in most of these models has remained simplistic. The typical assumption is that consumer preferences are uniformly distributed in space. This assumption, it is claimed, provides a uniform backdrop for observing interactions between price competition and market share effects. But, as demonstrated in this paper, it is necessary to examine different markets with varying levels of preference heterogeneity to understand how brand positions are affected by the balance between price competition and market share effects. We use the generalized beta distribution to perform comparative static analyses of positioning strategies with respect to consumer preferences.
We show that the equilibrium positions of brands in competitive markets is significantly affected by the distribution of consumer preferences. Indeed for duopolies and triopolies, we find a variety of equilibrium configurations that are related to the heterogeneity of consumer preferences. Maximal and minimal differentiation are just the two ends of the spectrum of possible configurations. The equilibrium in a particular market reflects the balance between the repelling impact of price competition and the agglomerative influence due to the market share effect.
In markets with uniform preferences, because of high consumer heterogeneity, the impact of price competition on brand positions is extremely strong. The homogenization of consumer preferences gives rise to an agglomerative force that counterbalances the repelling impact of price competition. As consumer preferences become more peaked, this agglomerative force exerts greater influence and brands tend to move inward. Therefore, the optimal positions of brands depend upon the level of heterogeneity in consumer preferences. In the three-brand case, the two exterior brands move inward in a regular fashion as the consumer preference distribution gets more peaked (the interior brand always prefers the modal consumer preference). This interior movement of brands also happens abruptly in some cases. In a duopoly, for example, brands are maximally differentiated when preferences are uniform. However, when preferences are relatively homogeneous, at equilibrium one brand takes an interior position, while the other chooses to be at the extreme of the product space. The change from one type of equilibrium to the other occurs abruptly as the concentration of consumers towards the middle of the market increases continuously. Thus, small changes in the distribution of consumer preferences can have significant effects on the equilibrium positions and prices of brands.
Our results also establish the advantage of early entry when firms enter in a sequence. The extent of this advantage depends upon the nature of consumer preferences. In a duopoly, first entrants have no advantage when consumer preferences are heterogeneous, but the advantage grows as the distribution becomes more peaked. When there are three firms, too, the advantage of the first entrant is larger in markets where consumer preferences are peaked. When consumer preference distributions are relatively homogeneous, positions near the modal preference are highly preferred. In such a scenario, early entry is desirable since the first entrant can capture the most preferred position.
We demonstrate, too, how the threat of potential entry affects the behavior of firms. Early entrants have to sacrifice some of their potential advantage in order to deter entry. The best entry-deterring strategy also depends on the distribution of consumer preferences, along with the level of fixed costs. The relationship between fixed costs and the number of entrants in a market is well known. But we show that the level of fixed cost also affects the equilibrium position of entrants in this market. When fixed costs are low, early entrants position near the modal consumer preference to deter the entry of later entrants. Positioning near each other in this fashion, increases price competition and adversely affects their profits. As fixed costs increase, the threat of entry diminishes, and incumbents can differentiate to reduce price rivalry. The pattern of differentiation depends both on the level of fixed cost and the extent of homogeneity in consumer preferences. Thus the behavior of firms faced with the threat of future entry depends on the consumer, competitive, and cost environments in an intricate fashion.
The introduction of a more general consumer preference distribution in positioning models adds considerably to their realism. However, the introduction of a more general distribution comes at the price of analytical complexity. We combine analytical calculus, a numerical search procedure and the powers of symbolic algebra software to establish and determine the equilibrium outcomes. We provide a method for proving existence and uniqueness for models in which direct analytical proofs are not possible because of their complexity. While some may have preferred the mathematical elegance of analytical solutions in simple environments, we prefer the empirical richness of the Defender model and add to its realism through our assumption of nonuniform preferences.
Our results provide important insights into positioning strategy. However, a number of aspects of product positioning remain unexplored. For example, extending the current framework to more than two attributes should be worthwhile. It is possible that in such multi-attribute markets firms may differentiate on the some attributes but not on others. Another possible extension is to model dynamic games in which firms choose positions in the first stage, taking into consideration the outcomes from repeated price games. It is likely that cooperative behavior might emerge in such environments and thus influence the positioning decisions of forward looking firms. Finally, future research should look at the behavior of multi-product firms concerned with maximizing profits of an entire product line. Step 1: Fix a symmetric unimodal beta distribution by specifying its parameters a, = a2 = c > 1.
Step 2: Fix a high reservation price R above which no consumer buys the good.
Step 3: Loop over 01 and 02 with 06 varying from 0 to 88 degrees in 2 degree increments and 02 varying from 01 + 2 to 90 degrees.
Step 4: Loop over P2 from marginal cost c to reservation price R in a grid.
Step 5: For each 01, 02, Pi, P2 combination, vary p1 from marginal cost c to price p",ax (at which DI = 0) in steps of = (pnax -c)/ 1.
Step 6: For each combination of 01, 02, pi and P2 check that the second derivative of 1 /D, with respect to p, is positive.
II. Algorithm to check for negative quasi-definiteness of the Jacobian. Steps 1-5: Identical as in the existence algorithm above.
Step 6: For each combination of 01, 02, p, and P2, check that the Jacobian of the best reply function is quasinegative definite or equivalently that J* = J + jr is negative definite.
III. Algorithm to determine the subgame perfect product and price equilibrium. Given a pair of positions (01, 02) and parameter a and a specific value for the marginal cost, the system of equations, (6) can be solved numerically through the application of Newton's method. For all results presented in the paper, a marginal cost of one was used.
The procedure for determining equilibrium price is embedded in a vertex substitution algorithm to determine the subgame-perfect equilibrium as follows:
Step 1: Initialize I = 1.
Step 2: Fix 02, the position of brand 2, to some initial value 01 between 0 and 90 degrees.
Step 3: Vary the position of brand 1 from 0 to (02 -e) degrees in increments of e. Calculate the second stage equilibrium prices and profits for each pair of positions. Identify the position for brand 1 that maximizes profit for that brand. Call this 01 = 06.
Step 4: Fix 061 at 06. Vary the position of brand 2 from 06 + e to 90 degrees in increments of e and calculate the second stage equilibrium prices and profits for each pair of positions. Identify the position for brand 2 that maximizes profit for that brand. Call this 02 = (21+l) and fix the position of brand 2 at this point.
Step 5: Increment / by 1 and repeat Steps 3 and 4. Stop if 0(6 ) = and 02 ) = 2. Otherwise, return to Step 3.
The entire algorithm was programmed in Mathematica. The programs are available from the authors on request. In addition to using multiple initial prices in Steps 3 and 4, we also used multiple starting positions in
